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commitment pursuant to the Law was neither civil commitment nor punishment for an offense.'-" Instead, commitment
under chapter 975 is an alternative to sentencing"2 and is an
independent proceeding different from penal sentencing.' 3 The
court recognized that although section 946.42(4) requires that
later sentences be consecutive to those which have been previously imposed, commitment under chapter 975 is not a sentence. Therefore, consecutive sentencing in this type of case,
while permissible, is not required by the statute. The court
admitted that the legislature might have intended the consecutive sentencing rule to apply to persons who escape from custody while committed. However, it should be noted that the
statute lacks language which would express this possible intent, and the court is bound to decide this issue in a manner
consistent with previous holdings. In addition, the court held
that since the defendant had already served the year's sentence
before the modification occurred, whether the modification was
in error or not involved moot issues."5 4
Problems inherent in the consecutive sentencing statutes
must be resolved for the benefit of defendants, their counsel,
prosecutors and the courts. Legislative intent is best provided
by clear statutory language, not by judicial construction.
Hopefully, the legislature will soon accept the court's frequent
requests for assistance in this area, and resolve the problems
of consecutive sentencing law.
THOMAS E. DUGAN
STEPHEN PAUL FORREST

INSURANCE
During the recent term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
again called upon to decide a wide variety of insurance cases.
court. If the defendant is not placed on probation, the court shall order the
defendant conveyed by the proper county authorities, at county expense, to the
sex crimes law facility designated by the department.
151. 76 Wis. 2d at 176, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59
Wis. 2d 148, 167, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973).
152. 76 Wis. 2d at 177, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, State v. Neutz, 69 Wis. 2d 292,
295, 230 N.W.2d 806 (1975).
153. 76 Wis. 2d at 176, 251 N.W.2d at 11, citing, Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505,
526, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
154. 76 Wis. 2d at 178, 251 N.W.2d at 12.
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In a case decided under Iowa law, the court indicated a willingness to adopt the liberal principle of honoring the reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries of insurance contracts, even though a painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated their expectations.' The court
also established that oral contracts of insurance will be liberally construed for purposes of providing coverage, and strictly
construed against insurers seeking to deny coverage. 2 However,
the court did not maintain this liberal stance when it declined
to adopt broad third party beneficiary principles urged upon it
in a case where a third party sought to hold a mortgagee liable
for failure to procure homeowners insurance for the mortgagor's
property.3 In other matters of contract interpretation, the court
considered the insured's policy obligations of furnishing notice
of loss4 and demanding uninsured motorist arbitration, 5 and
extensively discussed the meaning of the term "regular use"
within the context of the nonowned automobile liability coverage clause.6 However, the most significant cases decided this
term dealt with principles of subrogation. These cases and their
impact on Wisconsin practice will be discussed in the remainder of this article.
Few segments of insurance law have produced more problems for trial practitioners in recent years than the law of subrogation.7 The area is rife with confusion and uncertainty,
much of which is attributable to the supreme court's decision
in the now infamous case of Heifetz v. Johnson.8 With its decisions this term in Karl v. Employers Insuranceof Wausau' and
1. Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Cas. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 255 N.W.2d 903
(1977). For a discussion of this principle, see KEErON, INsURANcE LAW, § 6.3(a) (1971).
2. Roeske v. Diefenbach, 75 Wis. 2d 253, 249 N.W.2d 555 (1977).
3. Schell v. Knickelbein, 77 Wis. 2d 344, 252 N.W.2d 921 (1977).
4. RTE Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 247 N.W.2d 171 (1976).
5. Worthington v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 77 Wis. 2d 508, 253 N.W.2d 76 (1977).
6. Jones v. Perkins, 75 Wis. 2d 18, 248 N.W.2d 468 (1977); Hochgurtel v. San
Felippo, 78 Wis. 2d 70, 253 N.W.2d 526 (1977).
7. For an excellent discussion of the problems in this area, see Barron, "Heifetz"
and the Collateral Source Rule, 48 Wis. B. BuLL. 27 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Barron]. See also, Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and PracticalProblemsArising From
Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 255 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Capwell & Greenwald]; Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fleming]; Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcH. L. Rxv. 841
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Kimball].
8. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973); See Barron, supra note 7, at 27.
9. 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977).
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Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co.,10 the court has apparently answered several recurring questions faced by insurance
litigators and clarified at least one aspect of the Heifetz doctrine.
In Heifetz, the court stated that "[a]cceptance of payment
from an insurer operates as an assignment of the claim to that
extent whether or not the policy contains a subrogation agreement. The plaintiff loses his right to sue for any amount received from his insurer."" A literal reading of this broad statement would indicate that a claimant cannot recover the
amount of any "collateral source' '1 2 payments received from an
insurer regardless of whether the contract provided for subrogation. 13 However, this interpretation is unwarranted as it ignores
the "historical attitude" toward insurance subrogation" and
totally disregards the collateral source doctrine which has long
been followed in Wisconsin 5 and throughout the country.,'
Karl v. Employers Insurance of Wausau confirmed the opinion
of at least one commentator that the quoted passage from
Heifetz is dicta and does not apply to all types of collateral
source benefits. 7
In Karl, a plaintiff had been awarded $2300 for past medical
expenses by the jury. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff's judgment should have been reduced by the amount of the
plaintiffs expenses which were paid by his health insurer. As
10. 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).
11. 61 Wis. 2d at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
12. "The collateral source rule provides that the damages to be awarded to an
injured person are not to be affected by the fact that the claimant received compensation from other sources, such as sick leave, compensation, or insurance." Payne v. Bilco
Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972). See also Thoreson v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Trans. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972); Ashley v. American
Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 17, 119 N.W.2d 359 (1963).
13. Piper, Problems in Third-PartyAction ProcedureUnder the Wisconsin Workers' CompensationAct, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 91, 97 (1976); Barron, supra note 7, at 27.
14. Kimball, supra note 7, at 844-51.
15. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d
745 (1972); Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972); Ashley v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 17, 119 N.W.2d 359 (1963); Prunty v. Vandenberg,
257 Wis. 469, 44 N.W.2d 246 (1950); Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works, 175 Wis. 172,
184 N.W. 767 (1921); Marshall-Jackson Co. v. Jeffery, 167 Wis. 63, 166 N.W. 647
(1918); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee E.R. & L. Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
16. Fleming, supra note 7, at 1482; Maxwell, CollateralSource Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962); Schwartz, The Collateral-Source
Rule, 41 B.U. L. Rav. 348 (1961).
17. Barron, supra note 7, at 33.
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an offer of proof, the defendants introduced an interrogatory
answer made by the plaintiff's wife, stating that she was informed that Blue Cross had paid $1683 toward her hospital bill.
The trial court's refusal to reduce the plaintiff's recovery was
upheld by the supreme court:
The defendants failed to produce the alleged contract of insurance between the Karls and their hospital insurer even
though they had from the third day of December, 1970 until
the time of trial to pursue this matter. Neither the trialcourt
nor this court has been apprised of the nature of the particular insurance contract, whether it had a subrogationclause,
or whether subrogationwas waived. Because of the state of
the record we find no error in the refusal of the trial court to
reduce the judgment by the amount of the alleged insurance
8
recovery."
The italicized portion of the quotation indicates that, contrary to Heifetz, acceptance of payment from a health insurer
does not deprive the claimant of "his right to sue for any
amount received from his insurer."1 The passage implies that
a plaintiff is allowed to recover, as collateral source benefits,
amounts received from a health insurer where the contract does
not contain an express subrogation provision, where the existence of such a provision is not established, or where the insurer
waives its right to subrogation. This position is consistent with
the general rule that a health insurer or plan operator is not
entitled to subrogation by reason of payments made under a
contract, absent an express provision to that effect in the agreement. 0
To reconcile the Karl and Heifetz positions, it is necessary
to consider several fundamental principles of the law of subrogation. Essentially there are two types of subrogation: "legal"
or "equitable" subrogation which arises by operation of law (or,
more accurately, of equity)"' and conventional subrogation
18. 78 Wis. 2d 284, at 302, 254 N.W.2d 255, at 263 (emphasis added).
19. Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
20. Mich. Hosp. Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); Publix
Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 (1959); Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 1177 (1955); Fleming, supra note 7, at 1501-02; Note, Subrogation in
Medical Service Plans and MedicalInsurance Policies, 28 MD. L. REv. 292, 294 (1968);
cf., Barron, supra note 7, at 33.
21. Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 543, 253 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1977),
citing American Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 2d 346, 351-53, 187 N.W.2d 142, 14547 (1971); Kimball, supra note 7, at 841; 11 APPLmN, INSURANcE LAW & PRAcwm, §§
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which is the product of an agreement between the parties. 22 The
distinction is of critical importance in determining whether an
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the payee. Once it is
established that the party is entitled to be subrogated, it does
not matter whether the right is a legal one or a conventional
one, as Wisconsin law does not distinguish between the two
classes; recovery in each instance is dependent upon the same
equitable principles. Problems in determining an insurer's
right to subrogation arise only when the contract contains no
subrogation clause. 21 In such instances, the insurer will be subrogated to the insured's rights only where subrogation is made
by operation of law due to the
automatic by statute or arises
24
type of insurance involved.
In Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co.,2
the Wisconsin court drew a distinction between indemnity and
investment insurance contracts. Legal subrogation was said to
be an incident of the former but not the latter.2 6 This approach
27
was subsequently followed by the court in Campbell v. Sutliff.
However, the difference between investment and indemnity
insurance policies is unclear; consequently, this standard has
2
been criticized as inaccurate and uncertain. 1
6501, 6502 [hereinafter cited as APPELMAN]; 16 COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 61:3 (1966);
SHELDON, SUBROGATION § 1 (2d ed. 1893).
22. Kimball, supra note 7, at 841; 11 APPELMAN, supra note 21, §6501; 16 COUCH,
INSURANCE 2d § 61:3.
23. This is true in Wisconsin where assignment of virtually all tort claims is permitted. Associates Hosp. Serv. Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147
N.W.2d 225 (1967); D'Angelo v. Connell Paperboard Products Co., 19 Wis. 2d 390, 120
N.W.2d 70 (1963). See also, Wis. STAT. § 895.01 (1975); Bernardine v. Home & Auto.
Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1965); Davenport v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965); Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1965); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 32 Ohio Op. 2d
469, 210 N.W.2d 755 (1964).
In some states, assignment of personal injury claims is not permitted and contractual subrogation provisions in health insurance policies are generally held invalid in
such jurisdictions. Capwell & Greenwald, supra note 7, at 259-64; Frosthave v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1967); Harleysville Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495 (1966); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147 S.E.2d 860 (1966).
24. Baron, supra note 7, at 32; Kimball, supra note 7, at 844-60. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. §§ 102.29, 49.65 (1975).
25. 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
26. Id. at 37, 116 N.W. at 634. This is the position taken in COUCH, INSURANCE 2d §
61:4 (1966).
27. 193 Wis. 370, 374, 214 N.W. 374, 376 (1927).
28. Kimball, supra note 7, at 850-51.
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A leading commentary has suggested that an insurer should
be entitled to legal subrogation in cases where there is insurance against a loss measurable in economic terms, 9 as with fire
or collision insurance which are uniformly held to give rise to
legal subrogation. 0 The authors would deny subrogation only
3
where the insured has not been adequately indemnified. '
Another view distinguishes between contracts of personal
insurance and property insurance. Absent a specific policy provision, an insurer paying under a personal insurance contract
is not subrogated to the rights of the insured or beneficiary.2
The rationale underlying this distinction is that damages to the
person are less susceptible to precise determination. With damages for personal injuries, there is also a lesser likelihood of
double recovery by the insured and, for policy reasons, legal
33
subrogation is not allowed.
This standard appears to reflect more accurately judicial
treatment of the question as it allows legal subrogation under
fire and collision policies, but not under life or accident policies. " However, this approach has been criticized because of
the ambiguity inherent in the term "personal insurance."",
There is also a problem involved in applying the standard to
medical payments insurance which falls into the gray area between personal and property insurance. 3' This problem is illustrated by the Wisconsin court's statement in Heifetz to the
effect that the insurer was legally subrogated to the plaintiff's
claim by virtue of its payments to him under the medical payments provision of his automobile liability policy.37 The court
29. Id. at 859.
30. Id. See also Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee EIlc. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116
N.W. 633 (1908); CoucH, INSURANCE 2d § 61:233-61:235 (1966).
31. Kimball, supra note 7, at 859-60.
32. 3 APPELMAN, supra note 21, at § 1674; Note, Subrogation in Medical Service
Plans and Medical InsurancePolicies, 28 MD. L. REv. 292, 293 (1968); Flenling, supra
note 7, at 1499.
33. Id., Cf., Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W.
633 (1908); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. J. B. Parker & Co., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 72 S.W.
621 (1902).
34. Cf., Barron, supra note 7, at 33.
35. Kimball, supra note 7, at 845.
36. Note, Subrogation in Medical Service Plans and Medical Insurance Policies,
28 MD. L. REV. 292, 293 (1968).
37. It was not clear whether the insurance policy in Heifetz contained a subrogation
clause. The plaintiff executed a "subrogation receipt" on receiving payment from his
insurer. However, the court stated that it would not matter whether or not he had
signed the receipt. 61 Wis. 2d at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841. The opinion also does not
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took this position despite the fact that there was considerable
authority which indicated that medical payments do not give
3
rise to legal subrogation. 1
What then is the net effect of Karl and Heifetz? The Heifetz
doctrine should be applied only to medical payments made
under an automobile liability policy.39 The Karl principle
would certainly appear to apply to health insurance payments
made under contracts without subrogation provisions and in
cases where a health insurer waives its right to subrogation.
The law in Wisconsin with regard to other types of insurance
remains uncertain. While this remains the case, the safest approach in any case where it is necessary to determine whether
the insurer will be subrogated is to determine the particular
line of insurance involved, and then look to cases dealing with
40
contracts of that type.
One must wonder whether the legal/conventional subrogation distinction is warranted at this time. Much could be
gained by abolishing this dichotomy in favor of a uniform approach to the problem. This could be accomplished by recognizing automatic subrogation in all lines of insurance. However, in view of the widespread use and availability of subrogation clauses, 41 a more sensible solution would be a total abolition of the principle of legal subrogation. This would serve to
harmonize the law of subrogation with the collateral source rule
and add the element of certainty to this confused area by allowing subrogation only in those cases where the parties to the
insurance contract so provide. Until the time that remedial
action is taken, the courts will continue to split hairs and draw
artificial distinctions when faced with this problem.
indicate what effect, if any, § 204.30(6) of the Wisconsin Statutes had on the outcome
in the case. This statute became effective after the cause of action arose but before
the court decided the case and provided that an insurer was subrogated to the extent
of any payments made under the medical payments provision of an automobile liability insurance policy. Wis. STAT. § 204.30(6) (1971); Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 132.
38. Fleming, supra note 7, at 1501-02; Purcell v. Goldberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 344, 93
P.2d 578 (1939); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961); Annot. 13
A.L.R.2d 355 (1950). See Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61
N.W.2d 872 (1953).
39. Any analysis of the Heifetz case should also consider the effect of the new real
party in interest rule on the court's holding with respect to the effect of the failure to
join the subrogated insurer as a party. See Wis. STAT. § 803.01 (1975).
40. Kimball, supra note 7, at 845. See also 2 RICHARDs, INSURANCE § 184 (5th ed.
1952); VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3d ed. 1951).
41. See, KETON, INSURANCE LAW, § 3.10 (1971).

19771

TERM OF THE COURT

A different aspect of the subrogation tangle was before the
court in Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co.42 The court was
asked to determine the respective rights of an insured and subrogated fire insurer to damages recovered from a tortfeasor,
where the loss caused by the tortfeasor exceeded the amount
recoverable under the insured's fire policy.
The insureds in Garrity suffered a loss in the amount of
$110,000 as a result of a fire on their dairy farm allegedly
caused by the negligent operation of another's feed truck on the
property. Under their fire insurance policy which contained the
standard form subrogation clause, the owners were paid
slightly more than $67,000, the maximum amount recoverable.4" Upon receipt of the fire insurance proceeds, the insureds
executed a "subrogation receipt" which purported to subrogate
the insurer to all claims which they had against any third persons responsible for the loss.
Shortly thereafter, the insureds brought suit against the
owners of the feed truck and their liability insurer." When it
was disclosed that there was only $25,000 coverage on the
truck, the fire insurer sought a determination of its rights to
any amount recovered from the truck owners. The trial court
ruled that the fire insurer, as subrogee, had priority in the
recovery, up to the amount paid under the policy. The supreme
court reversed, holding that the insureds "must first be made
whole before the insurer is entitled to share in the amount
recoverable from the tort-feasor ....,,45
In so holding, the court adopted the common law rule which
prohibits recovery by the subrogee until the subrogor has been
fully indemnified.46 This full indemnity rule, which is followed
in the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the ques42. 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).
43. Lines 162 through 165 of the standard fire insurance policy provide as follows:
"Subrogation. This Company may require from the insured an assignment of all right
of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefore is made by
this Company." 77 Wis. 2d at 540, 253 N.W.2d at 513. Cf., Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1973).
44. Rural Mutual had written both the fire insurance policy for the dairy farm and
the liability policy which covered the feed truck. After suit was commenced against
Rural Mutual as insurer for the truck, it issued a third party complaint against itself
as subrogated insurer of the dairy farm and sought a determination of its rights in that
capacity. 77 Wis. 2d at 539-40, 253 N.W.2d at 513.
45. Id. at 541, 253 N.W.2d at 514.
46. Kimball, supra note 7, at 865.
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tion,4 7 applies to both legal and conventional subrogation.18
However, in such jurisdictions, parties to the insurance contract may contravene the common law rule by including an
appropriate provision in the agreement which establishes their
respective priorities in any amounts subsequently recovered.4 9
The Garrity court found nothing which altered the application of the common law rule in the subrogation clause in the
fire insurance policy.50 Additionally, the subrogation receipt
executed by the insureds had no effect on their priority in the
recovery. Since an express assignment of a claim to a subrogated insurer is unnecessary, 5 the mere execution of an assignment, without more, does not affect the insurer's right of recovery from a tortfeasor. 2 The practical effect of such an assignment is purely procedural: it relieves the insurer of the burden
of proving the existence of facts justifying subrogation since it
can sue in its own right by virtue of the assignment.13 Since
neither the subrogation clause nor the subrogation receipt spec47. KEgrON, INSURANCE LAW § 3:10(c)(2) (1971); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Ross, 129 Ill. App. 2d 217, 262 N.E.2d 618 (1970); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cincinnati, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 74 Ind. App. 272, 124 N.E. 774 (1919); Oakland County
v. Central West Cas. Co., 266 Mich. 438, 254 N.W. 158, aff'd on reh., 268 Mich. 117,
255 N.W. 733 (1934); Ward v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 98, 262 S.W. 450
(1924); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 67 N.J. Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120
(1961); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W.P. Rose Supply Co., 19 N.C. 254, 200
S.E.2d 655 (1973); Propeck v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 65 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933); Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).
48. This is true in Wisconsin, as subrogation is recognized or denied upon equitable
principles without differentiation as to its origin. 77 Wis. 2d at 543, 253 N.W.2d at
515; American Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 2d 346, 351-53, 187 N.W.2d 142, 145
(1971). The same holds true in a number of other jurisdictions. Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 129 Ill. App. 2d 217, 262 N.E.2d 618 (1970); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Cincinnati, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 74 Ind. App. 272, 124 N.E. 774 (1919); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 67 N.J. Super. 475, 171 A.2d 120 (1961); Lyons
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). Contra,
Shifrin v. McGuire & Hester Constr. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 420, 48 Cal. Rptr. 799
(1966); Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnel, 230 So. 2d 706 (Fla. App. 1970); Cervin
v. Garner, 25 Ohio St. 2d 231, 267 N.E.2d 769 (1971).
49. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 61:63, cf., Kimball, supra note 7, at 865.
50. 77 Wis. 2d at 544, 253 N.W.2d at 515.
51. Northern Assurance Co. v. Milwaukee, 227 Wis. 124, 277 N.W. 149 (1938);
COUCH, INSURANCE 2d §§ 61:93, 61:104; APPELMAN, supra note 21, §§ 4053, 4054. Cf.,
Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 120, 211 N.W.2d 834, 839 (1973).
52. 77 Wis. 2d at 546, 253 N.W.2d at 516; COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 105.
53. 77 Wis. 2d at 546, 253 N.W.2d at 516, citing COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 105. But
see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 28 Ga. App. 655, 112 S.E. 736 (1922) where an
insurer, suing by virtue of an express assignment, was barred from recovering because
it failed to show an equitable entitlement to subrogation.
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ified the priorities of the parties in the recovery, the insurer was
precluded from recovering by the common law rule.54
The Garrity decision should have several effects on Wisconsin practice. Subrogated insurers and individual claimants
generally have divided the proceeds of an inadequate recovery
in one of two ways. In some instances, relying on an unfortun5 5 subrogees have received
ate dictum in Patitucci v. Gerhardt,
the entire amount of the proceeds, up to the amount of the
subrogation claim, and the insureds have only recovered the
excess over that amount.50 The more prevalent practice, however, has been to distribute the funds received on a pro-rata
basis: the subrogated insurer and its insured each receiving the
same proportionate amount of their claim.5" The same pro-rata
distribution formula is generally followed in settlements of
claims between insurers.
As a result of Garrity, individual plaintiffs will generally be
indemnified before the subrogee recovers. This creates a potential adversity of interest between insurer and insured: the
plaintiff wants to see his uncompensated damages maximized
while the insurer wants these damages minimized so that its
chances of recovery are increased. This adversity should limit
the instances where an individual claimant's attorney also represents the subrogated insurer to cases where the tortfeasor has
clearly adequate liability insurance or financial resources to
fully satisfy both claims. Additionally, complications in settlement negotiations are foreseeable. For example, between subrogor and subrogee, who determines what amount will indemnify the subrogor? It is possible that a settling claimant will be
able to protect himself from a subsequent claim from the subrogee by properly structuring the release to identify which elements of the plaintiff's damages are being compensated in the
settlement. However, where the insurer's subrogated interest is
substantial, it is unlikely that it will readily acquiesce in the
allocation of settlement proceeds. It will be some time before
54. 77 Wis. 2d at 546-47, 253 N.W.2d at 516.
55. "If the amount of damages set by the jury is less than the insurance paid, the
insurer is the sole owner; if the amount is greater, the insurer is only a partial owner."
Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 363, 240 N.W. 385, 388 (1932).
56. Capwell & Greenwald, supranote 7, at 282.
57. Id.
58. KEarON, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10 (1971).
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claim settlement practices fully reflect the impact of the
Garrity decision.
Both Garrity and Karl have clarified selected areas of the
law of subrogation. While these decisions have raised additional questions, on the whole they should provide a basis for
greater harmony and consistency in future decisions of the
court regarding subrogation. The lack of such consistency in
previous decisions has been the major cause of problems in this
area.
PATRICK R. GRIFFIN

MUNICIPAL LAW
In the 1976 term the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed
a broad spectrum of municipal law issues. This article focuses
on five cases dealing with three of these issues: (1) the application of the Wisconsin Constitution's home rule amendment to
both a state statute and a municipal ordinance, (2) interpretation of the Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act, and (3)
the local governmental body's role in implementing the direct
legislation statute. Each of the cases discussed below represents the court's first determination of the issue involved.
I. APPLICATION OF THE HOME RULE AMENDMENT
This term the court dealt with the distinction between matters of statewide concern and matters of local concern in two
very different contexts. City of Beloit v. Kallas' involved a
state statute aimed at pollution control, while State ex rel.
Michalek v. Le Grand2 involved a municipal ordinance aimed
at improving housing conditions. In each case, the challengers
unsuccessfully argued that statewide concerns were being subjugated to local interests in contravention of Article XI, section
3 of the Wisconsin Constitution. This section, known as the
home rule amendment, provides in pertinent part:
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law are hereby
empowered, to determine their local affairs and government,
subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of
1. 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342 (1977).
2. 77 Wis. 2d 520, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977).

